Apologia Pro Vita Sua:

How I arrived at a "Sede-Doubtist Position" (Part I)

A. Introduction:

For many years, I was known online as a zealous, dogmatic anti-sedevacantist. A decade of polemical articles, posts on Cathinfo.com, my own defunct blogs, and various other internet fora, websites, and comments boxes had cemented a reputation as a cantankerous opponent of anything smelling of sedevacantism. Many were justifiably surprised, then, to discover some comments I’d made over at LSN which seemed to suggest I’d undergone a change of position, and was either now a sedevacantist myself, or at least open to the possibility of sedevacantism. If they were correct, what accounted for the change? And what exactly is my position now, if in fact there has been some change? It seemed strange to many that a once-prolific online writer should suddenly drop off the radar, only to be accidentally rediscovered advocating what seemed to be a very different position from his former R&R orientation. This article, then, will attempt to offer an explanation to those who might be interested in hearing one.

In this first installment, we will consider the intellectual and moral processes by which men arrive at religious truth in matters which do not avail themselves of mathematical certitude generally. In a second (and final) installment, we will show how these intellective processes, applied to our own particular circumstances, suggested (compelled?) the course I have embarked upon.

It is important to note that, although Part II will be more interesting to those who are familiar with my previous writings and positions, since it provides the details of how I arrived at my present position, Part I is essential for understanding why those details led to the conclusion which follows.

B. Newman’s Theory of Converging Probabilities

In a concise pamphlet titled “Newman: A Guide for Our Time,” Msgr. Philip Flanagan explained how Newman believed men arrived at certitude in matters which do not avail themselves of mathematical certitude:

“The basis of his argument is that in all matters of a non-mathematical nature the reasons which move us to assent are often implicit and personal [e.g., “signal graces” -SJ], convincing to the individual who sees them, but not susceptible to being put into words in a way that will necessarily convince others. As a rule, our conviction arises from what he called “converging probabilities,” a multitude of small indications, none of which is by itself sufficient to clinch the matter, but all of which point to the same conclusion which in the end the mind is forced to accept because no other conclusion can explain the evidence…to refuse to do so would be unreasonable…” (p. 25)

Concomitantly, Newman also emphasized the proper moral disposition in the reception of truth, as Msgr. Flanagan describes:

“Newman emphasizes also the need for the right moral dispositions in the search for religious truth. The man of goodwill is already looking for the truth, longing for it, watching and listening for any sign from God; and, when he comes across it, he recognizes it as the truth; it is what he has been looking for and he accepts it gladly, whereas the man who lacks the right dispositions will carp at it and find excuses for rejecting it. Thus, the same external evidence will convince one individual, while leaving another totally unconvinced.” (Ibid.)

This method of “converging probabilities” has always been one of the methods by which I have sought to apprehend truth (the two others being the discernment of spirits and seeking/receiving qualified counsel) in matters which do not avail themselves of mathematical and/or infallible certitude. Although the consideration of these converging probabilities is an exercise in intellection, I will explain it materially (in concreto), so that readers will clearly understand the mechanics of what is happening during this assessment process:

Take pen and paper, and in the center of the paper, write down a proposition you are considering rendering internal assent to, and circle it (e.g., Vatican II is not a legitimate ecumenical council). Now, around that circle draw an arrow pointing toward the circled proposition, and upon it write down one piece of evidence which seems to corroborate the truth of the proposition. Continue doing so for each additional proposition you believe evinces that Vatican II is nota legitimate council (e.g., It contradicts previous magisterial teaching; it professes novelties; it was not dogmatic; it defined nothing; it used the form of “council” but had none of the substance of a council; it overthrew tradition; it was the French Revolution in the Church; “If the Church was not divine, this council would have buried it”; etc. etc.

You will soon find that your circle is surrounded with dozens of arrows (i.e., pieces of corroborating evidence) pointing toward your circled conclusion that Vatican II was not a legitimate ecumenical council of the Catholic Church. In such a case, the intellect is drawn to consent to the proposition, since not to do so will seem irrational and dishonest.

It is important to note that Newman did not consider this method failsafe; it is not without the possibility and danger of error. Nevertheless, it will render such a high probability of truth and/or moral rectitude (something akin to what moralists would call “moral certitude”) that acting upon it will be eminently reasonable, even if not infallible. Neither should the lack of infallible certitude disturb the conscience, since in contingent matters infallible certitude is not possible, and it is therefore altogether unreasonable to expect it where it cannot be had.

Some readers may be familiar with my book “As We Are? 101 Compromises, Changes, and Contradictions of an SSPX in Pursuit of a Practical Accord with Modernist Rome,” which advanced the proposition that the SSPX had undergone a radical transformation of its apostolate, and supplied the evidence for it. The book was itself a gigantic exercise in Newman’s theory of converging probabilities, and proved the proposition through a cumulation of 101 indications so well, that to ignore affirming the conclusion would be unreasonable.

So much for the method.

In Part II, we will apply this method to my own particular circumstances, in defense of my present position.

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